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Europe’s financial autonomy still rests on foundations it doesn’t fully control. From payment networks to clearing systems to the dominance of the U.S. dollar in global trade, Washington’s influence runs through the core of Europe’s economic machinery. For a union that speaks often of sovereignty, this dependence is more than an inconvenience—it is a strategic vulnerability. If the EU wants to shape its own financial future, it must start by identifying and cutting the remaining strings that tie its economy to American infrastructure and policy.
Even if Europe builds its own debit/credit card network, two deeper layers remain U.S.-controlled. For example, the SWIFT (wire transfer system) governance although headquartered in Belgium, is heavily influenced by U.S. sanctions policy. Secondly, the U.S.-based cloud providers are hosting parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure.
The EU still settles a large share of its energy imports, commodity contracts & international trade in U.S. dollars, even when neither party is American. Reducing this dependence means an expansion of euro‑denominated energy contracts, incentivizing euro settlement in global trade and strengthening the euro’s role in central bank reserves.
Three American firms—S&P, Moody’s, Fitch—still dominate the credit ratings of EU Governments, EU banks & EU corporations. This gives the U.S. indirect influence over European borrowing costs.
Europe needs to do the following: Expand ESMA‑regulated European rating agencies, require dual ratings (EU + U.S.) for sovereign debt and build a public‑interest European ratings institution.
Most European banks still rely on companies like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure & Google Cloud for critical infrastructure. This creates exposure to U.S. legal jurisdiction, vulnerability to extraterritorial sanctions & strategic dependence on foreign tech.
The EU must mandate sovereign cloud for core financial services, accelerate GAIA‑X and European cloud providers and require financial data to be stored exclusively in the EU.
Key market infrastructure is still U.S.-centric like – clearing of euro‑denominated derivatives in London/New York, a heavy reliance on U.S. investment banks and Nasdaq ownership of Nordic exchanges.
The alternative is to shift euro clearing to the continent, strengthen the EU’s Capital Markets Union and build deeper domestic investment banking capacity.
The EU often aligns with U.S. sanctions because the U.S. financial reach is global and possibly European banks fear secondary sanctions.
Reducing this dependency means a stronger EU sanctions authority, a mechanism to shield EU firms from U.S. extraterritorial measures and lastly a credible alternative payments channel for sanctioned-but-EU-approved trade.
Europe can’t keep mistaking dependence for partnership. As long as the EU’s financial arteries run through American systems, its economic sovereignty is conditional—granted, not owned. The tools for autonomy already exist: European payment rails, European clearing, European cloud, European data governance. What’s missing is the political courage to use them. If Brussels truly wants to shape its own destiny, it must stop managing its dependencies and start dismantling them. Sovereignty isn’t declared; it’s built. And Europe’s moment to build is now.
